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Gene Drives: Dynamics and Regulatory Matters—A Report
from the Workshop “Evaluation of Spatial and Temporal
Control of Gene Drives,” April 4–5, 2019, Vienna
Bernd Giese,* Johannes L. Frieß, Nicholas H. Barton, Philipp W. Messer, Florence Débarre,
Marc F. Schetelig, Nikolai Windbichler, Harald Meimberg, and Christophe Boëte
Gene Drives are regarded as future tools with a high potential
for population control. Due to their inherent ability to overcome
the rules of Mendelian inheritance, gene drives (GD) may spread
genes rapidly through populations of sexually reproducing organ-
isms. A release of organisms carrying a GD would constitute a
paradigm shift in the handling of geneticallymodiﬁed organisms
because gene drive organisms (GDO) are designed to drive their
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transgenes into wild populations and thereby increase the num-
ber of GDOs. The rapid development in this ﬁeld and its focus
onwild populations demand a prospective risk assessment with a
focus on exposure related aspects. Presently, it is unclear how ad-
equate risk management could be guaranteed to limit the spread
of GDs in time and space, in order to avoid potential adverse ef-
fects in socio-ecological systems.
The recent workshop on the “Evaluation of Spatial and
Temporal Control of Gene Drives” hosted by the Institute of
Safety/Security and Risk Sciences (ISR) in Vienna aimed at gain-
ing some insight into the potential population dynamic behav-
ior of GDs and appropriate measures of control. Scientists from
France, Germany, England, and the USA discussed both topics in
this meeting on April 4–5, 2019. This article summarizes results
of the workshop.
1. Population Biology and Control Options
Nick Barton emphasized that while GDs are based on simple
technology, developing ways to use them safely is far more com-
plex and uncertain. In nature, complexmechanisms have evolved
to suppress viruses and transposons, including elaborate epi-
genetic mechanisms that suppress selﬁsh genes. Although we
have evolved alongside a variety of natural drives, application
of artiﬁcial drives may be dangerous. Most eukaryote genomes
carry a substantial burden from defunct transposons, and de-
vote substantial genetic resources to combating selﬁsh elements;
those elements may well be an important cause of extinction.
Barton raised the question whether the application of synthetic
drives could ever be a local, rather than global, decision, given
the high risk of unintended dispersal: GDs may be able to jump
to nontarget species, just as insecticide resistance can move be-
tween species (e.g., from Anopheles gambiae to A. coluzzii).[1] If
the driver reduces ﬁtness, selection favors resistance and a GD
may quickly become attenuated. Thus, a “parliament of genes”
may stabilize Mendelian rules, despite the prevalence of selﬁsh
genes.[2] Although modeling may give valuable insight into pop-
ulation dynamics—as Barton showed for a Wolbachia release in
Australia[3]—the predictions of amodel will be correct only under
the circumstances and variables used. Models may seriously mis-
lead if applied when key factors are unknown, or too numerous
to be taken into account.
Philipp W. Messer took up the tendency of resistance devel-
opment against GDs. For clustered regularly interspaced short
palindromic repeats (CRISPR)-drives in particular, resistance
BioEssays 2019, 1900151 © 2019 The Authors. BioEssays Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc1900151 (1 of 3)
www.advancedsciencenews.com www.bioessays-journal.com
represents a serious obstacle that should be most prominent in
suppression-drive applications. He explained that the evolution
of resistance is still diﬃcult to predict as a fewmismatches can be
enough to destroy a target sequence for homing endonuclease-
based GDs. Here, the multiplexing-approach may help lower
resistance rates, but should not be overestimated, as ﬁrst results
indicate: Champer et al.[4] have shown that multiplexing is not
actually multiplicative and resistance could not be suppressed as
eﬀectively as initially thought.With regard to the genetic status of
the population, the spread of resistance alleles can also represent
a genomic alteration induced by the drive. Those individuals are
not necessarily equivalent to the wild-type but rather, constitute
a fraction of the population that inﬂuences spread of the drive.
In an individual-based simulation aimed to model the spread
of a suppression drive against an invasive rodent population
on an island, Messer illustrated the importance of conducting
spatially realistic simulations. The dynamics observed in such
spatial models can be fundamentally diﬀerent from the models
of “well-mixed” populations currently used in many studies,
revealing new phenomena such as “chasing dynamics” where
wild-type individuals can quickly recolonize empty areas and the
drive never succeeds. These and other complexities that arise in
realistic models complicate predictions on the fate of concerned
populations.
Florence Débarre brought a deeper investigation of potential
control options for GDs into the discussion. She asked whether
the release of reversal drives could stop a drive that was either
accidentally released or had to be neutralized due to unantic-
ipated eﬀects. Débarre presented mathematical models of the
potential population dynamics, ﬁrst in well-mixed population,
and second, considering a population over a spatially continuous
environment.[5] The model referred to a reversal drive of the so-
called “CATCHA”-type. CATCHA, a “Cas9-Triggered Chain Abla-
tion” of Cas9 is based on a gRNA that cleaves the Cas9 gene and
inserts its own gRNA-coding sequence against Cas9.[6] Themodel
focusses on allele frequencies over time. Deterministic versions
indicate that the drive can only be stopped if it has an introduc-
tion threshold, i.e., if there is a frequency above which the drive
has to be introduced in a wild-type population in order to spread.
In the absence of such a threshold, the introduction of a reversal
drive leads to rock-paper-scissors like dynamics, the frequencies
of the original drive and the reversal drive oscillating over time.
These oscillations are of large amplitude, however, so that either
construct can be lost by chance, often leading to the recovery of
the wild-type population in stochastic versions of the nonspatial
model.
2. Applications of Gene Drives
Marc Schetelig, in his contribution to agricultural applications
for GDs, also referred to options for control as a dependence of
a GD on a second product. Sensitizing or optogenetic drives may
be used in this regard where optogenetic genes, e.g., induce sus-
ceptibility to light beams. According to Schetelig, eﬀective control
of pests for a speciﬁc time should be the goal of most GD appli-
cations. In contrast, suppression drives with the aim of species
elimination and systems that are prone to resistance should be
avoided. Also, resistance races with chains of GDs against the
other drives might not be reasonable in terms of economic and
control eﬃciency. Concerning regulation Schetelig noted that a
case-by-case evaluation would represent the most appropriate so-
lution because the term “gene drive” represents a multitude of
possible strategies—technically, ethically, and in terms of appli-
cability. For each system, the state-of-the-art tools should be com-
pared for their suitability and compared in a risk assessment to
new tools. This is diﬀerent from the current risk assessment in
Germany and many other countries, which evaluates only the
novel tool without comparing it to possibly inferior “state-of-the-
art” control options.
Nikolai Windbichler elucidated current developments in the
development of transmission-blocking GDs for malaria control.
From this viewpoint as a potential applicator, four challenges
need to be addressed to bring replacement drives to the ﬁeld.
First, how can antimalarial eﬀector molecules, characterized un-
der laboratory conditions and never exposed to heterogeneous
and genetically diverse Plasmodium parasites, been tested? Sec-
ond, what is the long-term persistence of genetic constructs
in the target population?[7] Third, which issues arise from the
molecular complexity of the GD constructs that currently envi-
sion incorporation of multiple large transgenes? For a CRISPR-
drive in particular, the compound ﬁtness cost of expressing Cas9
and a cargo gene may reduce the eﬃciency and persistence of
the drive. Lastly, regulatory complexity poses an additional chal-
lenge for GD releases. For addressing these challenges, a strat-
egy for the design, phased testing and roll-out of transmission-
blocking GDs was presented: The construction of minimal, ge-
netically simple GD components out of mosquito genes as well
as the molecular separation of the drive and eﬀector functions
allows the testing of these in the absence of a full GD.[8] There-
fore, a cargo gene could be driven non-autonomously along with
the drive component, where the cargo interferes with pathogen
transmission. In ﬁrst releases, a nondriving eﬀector component
alone would be tested for its transmission-blocking eﬀect and
its expected behavior in the ﬁeld. In a second phase, a nondriv-
ing Cas9-strain would be co-released to enable local spread of
the cargo gene. Finally, both eﬀector and drive strains now re-
sulting in full GD could be released in a third phase of this
approach.
3. Reasons for Concern
Harald Meimberg shifted the focus to the question how GDs af-
fect the integrity of ecosystems and to what extent they may ﬁt
with the concept of protection goals. Protection goals are con-
sidering generally a) the protected goods, b) biodiversity, and c)
humanwell-being. Especially problematic is the treatment of bio-
diversity and ecosystem services as synonym in the context of risk
assessment. Hence, if all ecosystem services are protected, so is
biodiversity. Functional redundancy might allow the conclusion
that a species can be removed from an ecosystem without per-
turbing the function of the system as a whole. Therefore, with
this concept, if reduced to its function the value of a species is
lower, if another species shows a similar function. This is es-
pecially relevant for GD applications, because here, a removal
of single species from the ecosystem is attempted. To rely on
potential compensation by other species hides the fact that the
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initial status of the system cannot be reestablished. In addition,
stressors often interact and produce combined eﬀects on biodi-
versity or ecosystem services.
4. Hype and Concern in the Discourse
Christophe Boëte highlights the fact that GD is highly trans-
formative and shows signs of post-normal science (applications
are associated with uncertainty and concerned with high stakes).
GD is indeed characterized as a potentially powerful emerging
technology that is confronted with multiple ethical dilemmas.
There are dual concerns about this technology: the research it-
self and its potential applications. Concerns over potential ap-
plication, in the light of the current rudimentary control op-
tions, clearly make it a candidate for the precautionary princi-
ple. Another burden for this new technology is the as yet open
question of whether the potential beneﬁts outweigh the poten-
tial costs. As seen for other innovations, communication is often
a key aspect in current research but as discussed by B. Wynne,
lay people are not so lay, and can have expertise too, making
the public one of the stakeholders.[9] Clearly, this calls for in-
clusion, dialogue, and co-construction, instead of the develop-
ment of communication strategy. This is a question of how to
organize discussion versus how to obtain a consent and in that
sense, this task implies great responsibilities. One of them is
transparency and it has been already been chipped away as re-
vealed by the publication of the so-called “gene drive ﬁles” (cp.
http://genedriveﬁles.synbiowatch.org/). Regarding communica-
tion of the technology, the independence of the actors involved
is also key and the implication of the International Life Sci-
ence Institute (ILSI), ﬁnanced by Monsanto and CoopLife Int.
and banned by the WHO in 2006 is not reassuring,[10] know-
ing the current interest of the agro-business for GD approaches.
Given the potential of GD and the associated risks, the implica-
tion of the UN agencies in public health (WHO), in food safety
(FAO), and in environment (UNEP) is highly needed to avoid the
stranglehold of lobbyists and non-state actors on research and
applications.
5. Perspectives
This workshop shed some light on issues that may become rele-
vant for eﬀorts to achieve control and to limit exposure to GD. At
the current stage of development, prediction of limits in spread
and persistence is severely restricted by insuﬃcient knowledge
of the behavior of GD. Orientation on the potential exposure
related characteristics of GD can be obtained from models in
well-deﬁned conﬁgurations, but they remain highly dependent
on a realistic choice of the potentially relevant parameters. With
regard to the eﬀect of a GD, we have to be aware of the crucial sig-
niﬁcance of biodiversity for the preservation of the “services” of
ecosystems that we rely on. In the light of the insight that initial
states cannot be fully reestablished after an intervention, applica-
tion plans for GD have to consider the precautionary principle.
Furthermore, achieving a high level of control as well as abilities
to limit the spread of GDs should represent integral parts of re-
sponsible research and development.
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